Design principles

Treat every input as untrusted and every output as potentially harmful: Multi-layer validation, prompt injection defenses, and output filtering apply to user inputs, memory reads, tool I/O, and agent-to-agent messages alike. The agent itself is not a trust boundary.

Give each agent its own identity and the minimum privileges to do its job: Per-agent authentication, dynamic permission boundaries, and scoped credentials per session limit what any single agent or compromised session can reach.

Partition memory, tools, and channels along trust boundaries: Sessions, users, tenants, and agents get separate namespaces, integrity checks on stored state, and authenticated and encrypted communication so contamination cannot move laterally.

Layer guardrails between intent and action: Pre-execution input filters, runtime alignment controls, and post-execution output filters keep agent behavior aligned even when prompts or contexts are adversarial. Critical actions stay gated behind human approval.

Continuously test the security posture: AI-aware vulnerability scanning, multi-agent red-team simulations, and runtime threat detection run as part of the lifecycle, not as one-time exercises.